Contemporary local government professionals work amid the conflicting forces of administrative modernization and civic engagement (Nalbandian & Nalbandian, 2002 Naschold & Daley, 1999a , 1999b , 1999c ; for a global perspective see Barber, 1995; Friedman, 1999; Kettl, 2000a; Sacks, 2002; Yergin & Stanislaw, 1999) .
MODERNIZING THE ORGANIZATION
At the level of the local jurisdiction, modernizing the organization is a trend that focuses on managerial practices and the scope of government. Organizational modernization, the socalled new public management or managerialism, emphasizes service delivery and performance with the instrumental goal of enhancing administrative capacity. The overall intent is efficient resource utilization and more effective and innovative policy support in the search for credibility, accountability, and improved trust in governing institutions.
The characteristics of local government modernization include:
· Connecting administrative processes to strategic goals · Integrating personnel and financial systems · Organizing around problems not departments · Decentralized decision making for timely, customized response · Market and competition orientation including privatization · Geographic information system-or global positioning system-related activities and Internetbased innovations · Results-based performance measurement and bench marking · Goal-based performance appraisal · Performance budgeting · Flexibility in organizing work and in personnel policies Every progressive local jurisdiction will have incorporated some if not all of these elements into its administrative practices along the lines indicated in the new public management literature (Heinrich & Lynn, 2001; Lynn, 1998; Salamon, 2002b) . The ubiquitous nature of the trend is based in part on technological innovation (especially in communication), specialization of knowledge, technical skill (and the rise of the technical specialist or technician), an emphasis on the professions and professionalism, and the image of private enterprise as a model for management.
The best practices metaphor symbolizes this trend. These are not good or better practices. They are the best. They are said to result from objective scrutiny and rigorous measurement. Best practices are amenable to importation from one jurisdiction to another with just marginal change to accommodate context. The jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction diffusion of best practice innovations contributes to an increasingly homogenized administrative world. Furthermore, the hegemony of modern best practices, and the hard data on which they are presumably based, drives out conventional wisdom and discounts the importance of local knowledge and tradition.
CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT
The forces of civic engagement are widely evident both locally and globally (Halvorsen, 2003; Haus & Klausen, 2004; Lukensmeyer & Brigham, 2002; Smith & Huntsman, 1997) . The emphasis and value of engagement and participation are evident in Putnam's (2000) work on social capital, in the communitarian movement (Etzioni, 1995) , and in the work programs of several philanthropic organizations such as the Charles F. Kettering Foundation (2005) . One of the key responsibilities of local leaders, elected and appointed, is building and maintaining a sense of community that engages citizens in social, economic, political, and civic activities. The characteristics of the forces of civic engagement and citizen participation are the following:
· Recognizing neighborhoods as the base unit of the community · Engaging citizens in administrative processes · Acknowledging expressions of direct democracy · More jurisdictional accountability and transparency with citizens · More two-way communication with citizens about policy, service delivery, and citizen obligations to the collective good · Partnerships with other nongovernmental sectors-private sector, nonprofit sector, faith-based organizations-as a way of creating a social fabric
The driving force behind this trend is the desire for identity, connection, and at least some measure of control over one's life (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Etzioni, 1993; Fowler, 1991; Sacks, 2002; Selznick, 1992) . People want to be part of creating and maintaining a community with which they identify, and they are willing to take a part in protecting a sense of community whether it is in Fairfax County, Virginia, or Fremont, California. The social anchors that community provides-the opportunities to build trusting relationships in a world where relationships have become fragile and temporary and to influence one's fate through personal involvement-drive this trend. Although civic engagement of this kind does not occur all the time, the spirit of public service and respect for the ideal of citizenship demands that elected and appointed officials act as if it will.
The force of modernization homogenizes our lives: No one can mistake a strip mall no matter how much landscaping; everyone knows what a Big Mac is; a green arrow at a traffic signal immobilizes no one. Modernization erases identity. The forces of civic engagement represent a countervailing trend, the wish to create something unique within one's control. Community connotes anchors and resting points. Community is narrative, a soap opera with episodes of virtue, vice, and intimacy. But most important, community is expressed and experienced uniquely when built authentically.
Is the civic engagement trend as powerful and important as the modernizing trend? Yes, but civic engagement is expressed with greater variety (for example, Collaborative Communities at http://www.collaborativecommunities.org; Community Building Resource Network at http://www.commbuild.org; Community Tool Box at http://ctb.ku.edu; and the National Community Building Network at http://www.ncbn.org). And, it would be naïve to think the trend is unique to the United States. The Participation, Leadership, and Urban Sustainability research project involves nine universities in nine countries excluding America. It documents 18 successful cases that combine political leadership and citizen engagement (see http://www.plus-eura.org/index.html).
The forces of administrative modernization and civic engagement conflict fundamentally, and the resultant tension brings these questions to us: Is there a way to purposefully connect the competing trends so as to achieve both modernity and community? How do we mobilize the force of modernization to create communities with individual character (Harvey, 1990) ?
The answers to these questions are found in the world of local government professionals whose responsibilities, roles, and values place them squarely in the center of the conflict. Table 1 shows how local government professionals experience the conflict. It identifies five dimensions along which local government professionals find the collision between modernizing and community building. Located in the first column are professional staff, departments, governing institutions, technical or specialized orientations, and a policy perspective. Together they do much to capture the culture of professional management. In the other column are elected officials, the chief administrative officer (CAO), community passion, citizens, and an attachment to place. These attributes are meant to connote a culture of civic engagement and participation. There are profound differences between the two orientations or cultures. The space between the columns presents gaps to be bridged to answer our fundamental questions. In short, the argument is that effective bridges connect the two trends. More generally and importantly, they join administrative or bureaucratic perspectives with grassroots democratic perspectives and in doing so add to a jurisdiction's capacity to join administrative capacity with political acceptance-key components in any community's ability to collectively chart and implement a desired future. Public leaders-governmental, private, nonprofit, or simply citizens-who understand the need to build these bridges, who have skills, and who respect the democratic foundations of local government will add value to their communities.
GAP ONE
The first gap identifies the difference in perspective between elected and appointed officials. Svara (1999) has examined these differences empirically in terms of time spent on mission, goals, administration, and management. Elsewhere (Nalbandian, 1994) , I have described them in terms of contrasting constellations of logic. Here I look at these differences in another way, with Figure 1 depicting the first gap in terms of the accumulated learning of professionally trained staff members compared with local elected officials (J. Arnold, personal communication, January 20, 2000) . The argument is that over time professional staff have learned to do their work more efficiently and more effectively than have elected officials. In other words, today's professionally trained staff has more knowledge, better tools, and more skills to do their work compared to their predecessors. To some degree, this can also be said about local elected officials, but not to the same extent. Thus, the gap grows over time.
There are several ways that professional staff accumulate competence at a faster rate than their elected counterparts. The nature of the professions is at the center of the learning. Professional education, although dramatically different in content from one profession to another, systematically conveys learning from one generation to the next while each generation builds new knowledge through research and practice within accepted paradigms.
There is no comparable systematic way for one generation of elected officials to learn from another. Term limits accentuate this learning problem. Many local elected officials practice their craft from scratch without the benefit of the accumulated learning of past generations. To some extent, the problem is ameliorated with training conducted by the National League of Cities, the National Civic League, state leagues, and individual jurisdictions. In addition, one should acknowledge that the learning needs-both substance and depth-of elected and appointed officials are different (Freeman, 1992; McDonough, 2000; Nalbandian, 1994) . But although this training and the kind of learning needed may warrant less divergence than I have drawn in Figure 1 , the gap cannot be expected to close without con- scious attempts to do so. This might not cause concern if the tasks elected officials face were inconsequential. But today's elected bodies worldwide face greater challenges associated with diversity, economic complexity, and citizen expectations than did their predecessors (Zakaria, 2003) . The crucial consequence of this widening first gap is greater potential for misunderstanding and mistrust between the perspective of elected officials and the jurisdiction's professional staff and more difficulty getting things done. This leads directly to the second gap in Table 1 , between the CAO and department heads.
GAP TWO
The CAO in local government has always had the responsibility of bridging the perspectives of the elected officials to whom he or she reports with the jurisdiction's professional staff, especially technically trained staff members who believe that there are right answers to the problems they confront. As gap one grows, the challenge of gap two increases. To bridge gap one, the city or county manager spends more time with elected officials than did his or her predecessor. The challenge here is that the CAO risks being seen by professional staff as the "sixth" council member, thus losing credibility with the staff. The extreme alternative is the CAO's blind defense of staff members with the attendant risk of losing the council's trust. One of the ways that city and county managers bridge this gap is to promote or hire staff into positions as department heads who understand and respect the governing body's perspective and role. To take an engineering example, I suspect that hiring nonengineers as public works directors will continue as CAOs attempt to find allies in their challenge of bridging the second gap so they can work on the first. In fact, based on anecdotal evidence, I am not at all surprised to find department heads who are expected to think like deputy city or county managers.
Looking at the second gap, the metaphor of the department as a silo or stovepipe gives way to the image of a funnel. Using the funnel metaphor, as the gap between elected officials and staff members grows, the diameter of the departmental funnels would be expected at the top to widen and eventually overlap because the diameter of the funnel's top represents the amount of space needed to absorb the uncertainty of politics. For departments to work effectively, the uncertainty and conflict in the political world needs to be formulated into problems to be solved. That is what those at key supervisory positions in the funnel do (Thompson, 1967; Wilson, 1989) .
The overlap between departmental funnels represents opportunities for horizontal and vertical connections. For example, Fairfax County, Virginia, recently introduced three crosscutting initiatives-emergency management, environmental management, and strengthening of neighborhoods and community building. These initiatives did not materialize magically. They represent adaptation as an administrative apparatus reacts to the first gap and builds relationships vertically and horizontally, helping to create policy networks in problem areas that matter to elected officials, professional staff members, and citizens alike. They will attempt the connection by either joining existing partnerships or creating new ones around these initiatives. These are the kinds of partnerships that lead many scholars to conclude that networks, coordination, and integration are concepts that characterize contemporary governance and government (Lynn, 2003; Milward & Provan, 2002; O'Toole, 1997; Salamon, 2002b) .
GAP THREE
The third gap contrasts the processes of governing institutions and what they are prepared to do with the passionate expressions of community wants. Newspapers are filled with stories reflecting passions that are carried into relationships among governing body members and their engagement with citizens.
The time dimension between these perspectives is starkly different. Citizens have grown to expect that their wishes will be fulfilled in the same time that it takes to make a purchase at Wal-Mart. Because they are expected to be steady, reliable, and enduring, governing institutions respond slowly by design. The character of public buildings depicts enduring value, solid forces, and expression of continuing and enduring public interests. They should represent the foundation values of public life amid the passion of private wants and needs.
Governing institutions are conservative by nature because they are the product of democratic values-representation, efficiency or professionalism, social equity, and individual rights (Nalbandian, 1991; Tussman, 1960) . These values form the bedrock of democratic governments seeking to find the right balance between an understanding that majority rule and individual rights often conflict. Changes to the institutions and how they do business risk upsetting the balance in these fundamental values. We go slowly on purpose. Governing institutions and their decisions result from compromises. Unlike nonprofit organizations or market-driven firms, government institutions deliver services and allocate social, economic, and political values authoritatively (Box, Marshall, Reed, & Reed, 2001; Denhardt & Vinzant, 2000; Gilmore & Jensen, 1998; Green, Keller, & Wamsley, 1993) .
Governing institutions and the work of public administration professionals are grounded in the legitimacy of the law-in legislation or a constitution or charter-and in regime values that constitute a normative base (Kettl, 2002b; Lynn, 1998; Rohr, 1978; Rosenbloom, 1983) . Thus, the legal requisites of due process (individual rights) and equal protection (social equity) are paramount and may contrast with the passion that energizes community. In fact one can argue that administrative agencies are designed to temper the passions of politics (Rohr, 1986) .
GAP FOUR
This gap revolves around communication between technically sophisticated professional staff and citizens with issues that cross the professions and departments (Smith & Huntsman, 1997) . Here is an example. When I was a council member, one of my political science colleagues was president of a neighborhood association. The city was planning to modernize what originally had been constructed to rural standards as a county road. The neighbors understandably expressed concern about the city's utilization of the full right of way that residents had come to assume was their private property. They were concerned about the value of their property, the safety of their children, the interruption in routes to school, and highway access, and as one might have surmised, they had come to an understanding that their neighborhood, as they had socially constructed it, was about to change. To paraphrase, my colleague told me, "The planning staff was courteous, accessible, and wonderful to deal with. Unfortunately, I couldn't understand a word they were saying!" This was the sentiment if not the exact words of a political science professor, someone who knew government as well if not better than I do. He said that the staff talked in terms of plats, parcels, zoning, rezoning, and text amendments, and instead of saying "street," they said "right of way," and instead of saying "drive ways," they said "curb cuts." He said that he heard everything they said while understanding little.
Professions are ways of mastering knowledge, utilizing it ethically, and transmitting it systematically from one generation to the next. But as the knowledge base becomes more sophisticated, professionals run the risk of distancing themselves from the people they serve (Charles F. Kettering Foundation, 2005; Schon, 1983) . Modern local government administration is filled with go betweens. Even though governing body members may expect them to fill the role of technical expert, increasingly, I argue (Nalbandian, 1990) , it is the role of the CAO and department heads to serve as go-betweens.
GAP FIVE
The last gap juxtaposes policy and place. Affordable housing is a key economic driver for the Silicon Valley. Which political jurisdiction will authorize high-density housing to solve the problem? This tension is captured in the not in my backyard phenomenon. Policy that is sound when framed regionally fails when the issue spawning the regional solution is dealt with locally. Public managers, oriented toward problem solving, create formal and informal interlocal agreements in response to regional policy and managerial problems. But as Frederickson (1999) notes, this kind of networking is much more likely to occur at the administrative than political level (Thurmaier & Wood, 2002) .
BRIDGING THE GAPS
Bridges come in many forms and are found in every city, county, and region. They may be as simple and temporal as a meeting between staff members and a neighborhood association regarding a land use issue scheduled for the planning commission. But they may be complex as well, including partnerships to build major civic projects or deliver public services (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003) .
For example, at Iowa State University, professors Ho and Coates are engaged in a statewide project designed to promote citizen-initiated performance assessment of municipal services including public safety. The goal is to develop citizen-driven measures that matter to residents as residents understand them. Those familiar with the closed culture of public safety agencies will understand the remarkable challenge this project has taken on and the potentially fruitful bridges that can result (Iowa State University, Public Policy and Administration Program, 2003) .
In Lewisham, England, a working-class borough of London, a stratified demographic sample is drawn to create a citizens panel of 1,000. These citizens agree to participate in citizen surveys for 3 years, to be included in a pool from which citizen public policy juries are drawn, and to participate in a minimum number of public forums annually (see http:// www.ronneby.se/dialogue/ENG/cpanel.htm).
In metropolitan Kansas City, the Mid America Regional Council (MARC) acts in a brokering role providing an interjurisdictional bridge for networks involving regional planning, transportation, and homeland security. In addition, MARC sponsors two important forums monthly where CAOs and their assistants gather and discuss regional issues (Thurmaier & Wood, 2002) .
Intersectoral bridges are facilitated as local jurisdictions utilize their authority to create tax increment financing districts. These districts permit private investors to leverage their wealth, to cushion their financial risk, and to tackle projects that at least in part advance public purposes. My intent here is not to evaluate the effectiveness or appropriateness of tax increment financing but rather to illustrate how local jurisdictions utilize their authority in partnership with others to join what is politically acceptable with what can be accomplished.
Every local jurisdiction and region has examples of these activities. The more effectively a community connects the forces by building bridges and creating intersections, the more successfully it closes the gaps and puts itself in a position to positively answer the crucial question we started with: how to utilize the tools of modernization to build unique communities. In other words, bridging the gaps is the key to successfully joining modernization and citizen engagement, especially where power in government institutions seems increasingly irrelevant (Judd, 2004; Kettl, 2000b Kettl, , 2002b Salamon, 2002a) .
CASE STUDY OF BRIDGE BUILDING (NALBANDIAN, 2000)
In the late 1990s, the International Speedway Corporation (ISC), headquartered in Daytona Beach, Florida, was searching for a site in the Kansas City area where it could construct a NASCAR track. ISC is the major player in NASCAR racing; its interests include ownership of several tracks that host motor racing.
Plans called for a $250 million facility in the metropolitan Kansas City area that eventually could accommodate 150,000 people. The project would develop some 1,000 acres, more than the combined area encompassed by Arrowhead Stadium (Kansas City Chiefs football) and Kauffman Stadium (Kansas City Royals baseball) and would require easy access from interstate highways. ISC would partially fund the project and expect public money to finance the rest.
Implementation issues consumed Dennis Hays, the CAO of the recently merged Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas. The last thing he had in his mind was a racetrack fantasy. But citizens who never had been involved in civic affairs began sending messages to their elected representatives and to Hays urging them to find a way to get NASCAR to Kansas City. There was opposition as well, and it added up to a lot of uncertainty. Finally, Mayor Marinovich proposed sending a delegation of citizens-those in favor, those neutral, and those opposed-to Fontana, California, to view a race. They went and in addition to experiencing race day, they walked neighborhoods asking people what they felt about the racetrack, what effect it was having on their neighborhood and their city. They returned with the opposition largely neutralized.
Hays recalls, I got to the mayor, and I remember saying, "Mayor, do we want this? Do we throw everything we have after it?" She was facing a September election, and she couldn't know how this would affect her chances to become mayor of the consolidated government. But she looked at me, and she said resolutely, "Yes, we are going for it." (Nalbandian, 2000, p. 9) A clear majority of the council sided with the mayor. And then from the standpoint of learning about bridge building, a key event occurred. Working on ISC's timetable, Hays was required to bypass council and make decisions he never would have imagined a CAO could make without public hearings and council approval. He called a meeting at his house on a Sunday. He called the mayor and said, "I need you at my house tomorrow!" (Nalbandian, 2000, p. 9) . For another manager in another context, calling a meeting such as this might not have seemed out of character, but clearly it was for Hays. He did what he felt was necessary, inviting his misgivings about the role he was embarking on as a policy leader, as a cheerleader and advocate of a project he was simultaneously being asked to evaluate as a professional public administrator.
Time pressure kept Hays in front and in the limelight. At meetings where the mayor and the state's lieutenant governor were present, he was the spokesperson. Only he knew the answers to the questions, and everyone deferred to him, even when he did not know the answers.
I interviewed Hays, the mayor, and others involved in the project, attempting to understand how a CAO could become aligned politically, committing administrative suicide, and still survive with plaudits and credibility. The answer, I concluded, was twofold. On one hand, Dennis Hays embodied the role of the politically neutral public administrator who would be expected to advocate for the public interest. In no way could one know Hays and think he would take a position motivated to advance his own career or standing. In one of the best stories I have heard about a city manager, the mayor described Hays as their Mr. Rogers. He even admitted to coming to work in a cardigan sweater from time to time. There was no one you would trust more with your children (your city)! At the same time he was being thrust into the forefront, he was questioning his role. He was supposed to be political neutral, a person who stood in the background who directed from the rear. He had become the opposite. He agonized about the proper role of the CAO. His professional training provided more caution than guidance. But ultimately, if unwittingly, he found his grounding in public values. In his dealings, his public appearances, his inner thoughts, he respected the values of representation, efficiency, social equity, and individual rights. His actions and words respected those values, and he embodied them for the citizens and elected officials he worked with throughout the project.
Dennis Hays embarked on a bridge-building role with community building responsibility through an economic development project. Securing NASCAR racing in Wyandotte County, Kansas, gave hope to a community that was once a manufacturing thoroughbred. It was suffering from the transition to a service economy. In fact, the story that sold the effort was "It is our last chance!"
Hays's role as leader was not one of command and control. He fulfilled every role that Wheeland (2000) discovered in his study of city management-educator, listener, facilitator, subordinate, and director. But most important, he was the main bridge. He pulled everything together. He worked in partnership with the mayor. She handled the council, and he handled the finances. They were an unparalleled team. Her political savvy and grace deferred to his expertise. He displayed his expertise with deference to his political leaders. He was the leader but only because he was an effective facilitator. Partnerships with the economic development community were easy to forge because the mayor, the council, and the CAO were on the same page.
BRIDGE BUILDING RESPONSIBILITIES, ROLES, AND VALUES
To understand Hays's actions conceptually, we can turn to the responsibilities, roles, and values that guide these professionals as they seek to bridge the gaps, creating capacity for local jurisdictions to reconcile administrative modernization with citizen engagement that leads to community building. Table 2 identifies the work that contemporary local government professionals perform in terms of responsibilities, roles, and values. This is the work Hays performed, and it captures for me the breadth of the bridge-building metaphor. I first utilized these categories to understand professionalism in local government in 1991 with research grounded in interviews with a representative group of local government professionals (Nalbandian, 1991) . That research documented the role of the city manger as policy maker, negotiator, and broker of community interests and grounded the CAO's actions in responsibility to the value diversity of the community and the wishes of a governing body. The value diversity was expressed in terms of representation, efficiency, social equity, and individual rights.
A decade later, I revisited the interviewees (Nalbandian, 1999) . I asked what had changed in a group that had added a few new members. Enhanced responsibility for community building within the organization and outside of it was newly evident. Managers moved from policy makers, negotiators, and brokers to facilitators, indicating a less authoritative, controlling 320 ARPA / December 2005 position. In the newer role, the manager had become less the boss and more the authoritative convener. I illustrated this responsibility and role in the NASCAR case study that reinforced the grounding contribution of the values (Nalbandian, 2000) . The case placed the CAO squarely in the middle of an issue where some expected him to be a crucial political advocate whereas others expected him to be a critical analyst. His credibility in bridging these expectations, I concluded, was because of his having internalized the public service values identified in Table 2 .
The differences here from my previous studies are in the metaphors that describe the roles and responsibilities: building bridges and creating intersections. Local government professionals bridge the gaps in the traditional framework of administrative and political perspectives that represent conflicting values and cultures, and they also find themselves pivotally located to connect professional, citizen, political, and organizational cultures. When done effectively, they create opportunities for action and for deliberative discussion. The more bridges, the stronger the local community's capacity to chart its future. The fewer bridges, the more likely the community will divide politically with attendant delay in dealing effectively with difficult issues.
These conclusions about responsibilities and roles, if not values, are strongly supported not only in other city management literature but also in the governance literature and in literature about citizen engagement. I already have referred to Wheeland's (2000) analysis of data from a 1996 International City and County Management Association survey that support the role of the city manager as facilitator, listener, and educator. Svara's (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Svara, 1990) extensive work documenting the sharing of power between elected and appointed officials in local government is compatible with this view as well.
In the governance literature, networks have become prominent, sometimes alongside hierarchy, at other times layered on top of it, and on occasion replacing it. Authority often is expressed indirectly (Considine & Lewis, 2003; Heinrich & Lynn, 2001; Kettl, 2002a Kettl, , 2002b Milward & Provan, 2002) . As Kettl (2002b) states, "Administration is about coordination, and twenty-first century coordination increasingly is about bridge building. The transformation of governance calls for new bridges built in new and innovative waysbridges that will cross wide divides and that will endure" (p. 168). According to Kettl (2002a) , "Managers, in short, do not manage programs or agencies. Rather, they manage networks" (p. 493). This is a very strong statement that is more accurate at the federal than local level, but it certainly covers a measure of the local government professional's work, especially in larger organizations and in counties (Kettl, 2000b) .
In turn, the bridge-building metaphor leads to a description of managerial behavior that is nonhierarchical and that employs authority in indirect ways-as in convening, arranging, agenda setting, and legitimizing-rather than deciding (Denhardt & Vinzant, 2000) . In this sense the ability and willingness to make connections becomes paramount and crucial to effective citizen engagement. Stivers (1994) coins the term the listening bureaucrat, and Box et al. (2001) write about collaborative relationships between citizens and public administrators where administrators have become helpers and facilitators. Salamon (2002a) refers to enablement skills. He elaborates by identifying activation skills-the ability to mobilize and orchestrate partnerships and modulation skills-finding the right combination of incentives and motives to bring about positive results in these complex arrangements (p. 608). In addition, Nalbandian and Nalbandian (2003) have drawn up lists of knowledge, skills, abilities, and personal attributes useful in bridge building.
Although the responsibilities and roles listed in Table 2 are very compatible across a range of contexts, the values are not. The combination of these values is uniquely public, and that is why local government professionals as bridge builders become midwives of civic discovery.
BRIDGES AS THE FOUNDATION OF CIVIC DISCOVERY
Taken in whole, the bridges constitute a new kind of infrastructure. Rather than physical infrastructure, these bridges represent capacity to help jurisdictions make difficult political decisions-ones that can tear communities apart. The bridges with the most carrying capacity are constructed through deliberative thought and action that engage traditional democratic values-representation, efficiency, social equity, and individual rights-with conflict in values at the root of difficult local issues (Kirlin & Kirlin, 2002) . In the absence of credible legislative forums, the bridges become critical elements in advancing democratic values, but only if the values are engaged authentically.
Authenticity is crucial, as the critique of postmodernism by Stivers (1994) , Box et al. (2001) , and Harvey (1990) , and as Dennis Hays's actions in the NASCAR case, remind us. One important reason why modernizing and civic engagement are so difficult to reconcile is that building something unique and valued is rare. It is efficient to replicate what exists or what existed (Harvey, 1990) . But one cannot replicate the adjudication of democratic values. Each community that works must survive its own struggles, which increasingly, I argue, are taking place on the bridges and less frequently solely in executive and legislative bodies.
Not all bridges are equal when set against the challenge of fostering authentic decisions based on deliberative engagement. Complicating the challenge are the multiple arenas and actors that now are part of determining the successful engagement of politics and administration. In his review of large-scale development and infrastructure projects in urban areas, Judd (2004) points out that today "most ambitious undertakings are not located in municipalities at all, but in a panoply of special authorities" (p. 12). Furthermore, Judd continues, The politics of urban redevelopment is rapidly moving from the arena of electoral and municipal projects into an expanding number of institutions that operate with little public accountability. These institutions, in turn, seek to enhance their political authority by seeking support from a constellation of supportive actors. (p. 11) With implied understanding of this phenomenon, Behn (1998a) points out that traditional public administration that relates politics and administration in hierarchical fashion may suffer empirically. But as a template to examine issues of accountability and to convey the axiom of political supremacy over administrative technique, nothing is better. Whitaker, AltmanSauer, and Henderson (2004) might argue that their concept of mutual accountability modifies Behn's (1998a) assertion. Nevertheless, in a networked world where privatization is advocated and intersectoral partnerships are touted for their political attraction and their ability to produce results, accountability to a full range of public values may take a back seat (Gilmour & Jensen, 1998; O'Toole, 1997; Salamon, 2002a, p. 603; Terry, 1998) .
If the significance of jurisdictional hierarchy is diminished and if traditional forms of accountability are disabled, then professionals play a particularly important role in constructing bridges that introduce and authentically engage public values (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987) . John Rohr (1978) and David Rosenbloom (1983) have been reminding us for years that professionals could and should carry regime values into their work. Cooper (1998) and Green et al. (1993) convey a similar message. They see it as an ethical obligation. Their message is especially timely as we create and reinforce a hollow state (Milward & Provan, 2002) . Kettl (2002a) writes, "An important but often overlooked fact is that this [indirect government] is not just a production function-delivering goods and services in exchange for a fee. It is also a value-transfer function" (p. 507). Similarly, Feldman and Khademian (2002) argue, "Managers are involved not only in producing results that consist of numerical policy goals, but also in facilitating the creation, development and change of various governing structures that enable and constrain actions" (p. 542). Finally, Behn (1998b) asks pointedly, Why would we assume that the manager of a business firm, the manager of a nonprofit socialservice agency, the manager of a religious organization, or the manager of a political party would have something useful to contribute to the political process but a public manager would not? (p. 221) It is not enough to argue that public managers can and should convey public values. How they do this will determine their effectiveness. Without traditional authoritative forums, the competencies necessary for the effective public manager center on educating, facilitating, listening, helping, and enabling-and doing so in ways that embody regime values-in ways that Dennis Hays modeled. In this sense, the public manager becomes a midwife to civic discovery.
SUMMARY AND QUESTIONS
Encouraging modernization is necessary to bring the most efficient and effective methods to administrative aspects of governing to produce measurable results (Osborn & Hutchison, 2004) . Equally important is fostering effective citizen investments that create the public good through engagement. But as stated at the outset, most important is building bridges between the two forces. Closing the gaps between techniques and approaches associated with modernization and the passion and perspectives of citizen engagement to create communities with character requires connections and networks-in short a panoply of arrangements represented with the bridge metaphor.
I believe that when local government professionals fulfill the roles and responsibilities and embrace public values, as Dennis Hays's case demonstrates, they add value to their communities. Their value lies in two areas. First, they provide bridges that connect political acceptability with administrative feasibility. Second, they facilitate the creation of paths to civic discovery.
In Table 1 the two columns connote professional managerial and community cultures. Throughout the article I have been drawing distinctions between the two and suggesting that they are the critical elements driving our understanding of contemporary community. Obviously there are no two single forces that make that claim. But if we add the political culture of a community and the organizational culture of the government to this mix, we will find an even richer, although much more complicated, context for action.
In Judith Gruber's (1987) classic work on bureaucracy, she found very different cultures in educational, fire, and housing departments. Today, the subject of organizational culture is standard fare in discussions of organizations (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Keyton, 2005) . It is not enough to talk just about modernizing the organization because different departments or professions will approach that task differently. My sense is that there are overriding similarities that this trend engenders, however, and that is why I have placed so much emphasis on the force of modernization. But context does matter.
Similarly, it is simplistic to argue that a community's political culture and the culture of engagement are always the same. Probably there are overlaps, but politics always counts, as O' Toole and Meier (2004) have pointed out in their latest work on network management. And citizen engagement and the dimensions of political power may not always coincide.
In the future, it seems to me that one salient research question in this regard is how the professional managerial culture, the culture of civic engagement, a community's political culture, and the various cultures represented in a complex government institution interact. How do the overriding forces of modernization and civic engagement influence political and organizational cultures? Or is this assumed causal relationship flawed?
With regard to the value that the local government professional adds to civic discovery, important questions are Do public managers actually reflect public values and promote public deliberation as we say they should and as we can note in individual cases? Do others recognize that role? And is this valued by others? In short, I would truly be interested in knowing the value that others believe the public manager adds to the discussion when public, private, and nonprofit representatives are sitting at the table.
